Covert Operations: China’s Espionage in U.S. Academia, Corporations, and Biolabs

November 15, 2024 Matt Helmkamp

Executive Summary

The U.S. has seen a troubling rise in espionage-related incidents involving Chinese nationals, revealing vulnerabilities across various sectors, including elections, academia, and corporate collaborations. Each incident underscores how foreign influence can infiltrate critical systems in ways that undermine national security. While these cases may seem isolated, they collectively indicate a broader, strategic effort by foreign actors to access sensitive information and exploit systemic weaknesses. This report examines cases that highlight gaps within U.S. electoral systems, academic institutions, and biosecurity protocols, pressing for a reevaluation of existing safeguards.

Electoral Interference and Academic Influence

The security of U.S. electoral systems came under scrutiny in Michigan when a University of Michigan student from China illegally registered to vote and cast a ballot. Days before a pivotal election, the student leveraged residency documentation to gain voting access, signing an affidavit that falsely declared U.S. citizenship. Under Michigan law, once a ballot is cast, it is anonymized and irreversible, meaning that this illegal vote remains in the system. Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson and Washtenaw County Prosecutor Eli Savit acted quickly, highlighting the severity of the infraction and the penalties for voting fraud. However, the incident raised significant questions about Michigan's voter registration processes, especially as election laws allow residents to register up until Election Day without requiring proof of citizenship. In a highly competitive electoral environment, especially in battleground states like Michigan, such security lapses could potentially influence election outcomes and reflect a broader vulnerability in the U.S. election infrastructure.

This incident is not isolated but ties into a larger pattern of potential foreign influence targeting university campuses. Universities often serve as environments where academic collaboration intersects with sensitive research areas, making them prime targets for foreign actors interested in accessing U.S. infrastructure. In Michigan, for instance, academic programs have unintentionally opened channels for foreign nationals to access crucial sites and even influence local governance structures. International students, especially those from countries like China, often engage in both overt and covert activities that may support intelligence objectives. As academic institutions seek global partnerships, cases of espionage-related activities connected to foreign nationals highlight the need for better vetting and oversight in academic environments.

The influence of foreign students on U.S. campuses is far-reaching, impacting not only university resources but also local political environments. National commentators, including political figures like Elon Musk and former President Donald Trump, have voiced concerns that lenient voter registration procedures open avenues for foreign actors to subtly influence local and state-level governance. In an environment of highly polarized political discourse, any breach of election integrity—intentional or not—can have a profound impact, potentially affecting public perception of the election process itself. Heightened scrutiny around foreign student populations and their access to both local and state resources is now a pressing issue, one that calls for balancing the openness of U.S. academic institutions with national security needs.

Beyond Michigan, cases around the country indicate that foreign students and researchers may be involved in activities that extend beyond typical academic pursuits. The FBI has documented multiple cases where Chinese nationals in academic institutions or research roles have been accused of technology theft or intellectual property violations. For instance, Bo Mao, a professor with affiliations at the University of Texas, allegedly stole proprietary technology for Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications conglomerate. In Boston, a Harvard-affiliated researcher was arrested for attempting to smuggle sensitive biological samples out of the country. Such incidents contribute to a complex narrative in which foreign nationals, often through academic exchanges or educational programs, become conduits for technology transfer and espionage, underscoring a clear risk for U.S. universities and research institutions.

Military Surveillance and Academic Exploitation

The reach of foreign espionage extends beyond electoral systems into some of the most guarded areas of U.S. national security, including military installations. In August 2023, five Chinese nationals—students previously associated with a joint program between the University of Michigan and Shanghai Jiao Tong University—were discovered near Camp Grayling, a strategic Michigan military training facility. The group was found photographing and possibly recording aspects of the Northern Strike exercise, one of the U.S. Department of Defense's largest reserve component readiness drills. When approached by a Utah National Guard officer, the students initially claimed to be members of the media. However, further investigation revealed attempts to delete the photos they had taken, which raised immediate suspicions about their true intentions.

This incident is not isolated but represents a growing trend of foreign nationals, especially students, being implicated in similar espionage-related activities near sensitive U.S. locations. The involvement of students in these cases reflects a larger strategy: leveraging educational exchanges and academic partnerships as entry points to otherwise restricted areas. The five students from Camp Grayling were part of a dual-degree program between the University of Michigan and Shanghai Jiao Tong University, a collaboration that has since come under scrutiny for potential security risks. Representative John Moolenaar publicly urged the University of Michigan to sever ties with its Chinese counterpart, citing national security concerns. For U.S. military and intelligence agencies, the line between academic exchange and strategic surveillance is becoming increasingly blurred, complicating decisions on foreign partnerships in academia.

Similar patterns have been observed at other military sites in the U.S. In Key West, Florida, several Chinese nationals were arrested over an 18-month period for unauthorized entry and suspicious activity near the Naval Air Station, a highly sensitive area for U.S. defense operations. One case involved two Chinese students who bypassed security and proceeded to photograph restricted areas within the base. When apprehended, they insisted they were tourists, an excuse frequently employed by individuals found in these scenarios. Despite the apparent amateur nature of their actions, intelligence experts point out that these “bumbling tourist” personas are often used as a cover for amateur espionage, allowing agents to gather information under the guise of tourism or curiosity. Their actions, while seemingly innocent, align with patterns observed in Chinese intelligence activities, which often integrate civilians in a whole-of-society approach to gather information.

These cases underscore the dual use of academic institutions as both research hubs and potential intelligence networks, leveraging student access and exchanges for covert surveillance activities. Reports from Germany and other European nations corroborate this tactic, with intelligence agencies noting how Chinese exchange programs and state-sponsored scholarships can serve as intelligence pipelines. German security agencies, for example, have documented concerns about students involved in the China Scholarship Council (CSC), a program requiring allegiance to the Chinese government, which can include collecting information on technologies and sensitive infrastructure abroad.

As a result, military and intelligence officials are increasingly wary of academic partnerships that lack strict oversight and have little regard for students' affiliations with foreign states. This concern has prompted calls for increased screening of foreign students and researchers, especially those from China, who are associated with sensitive scientific and technological fields. While American universities prize openness and intellectual exchange, the risks associated with unchecked access to critical sites are driving a shift in how these institutions balance collaboration with national security.

Unauthorized Biolabs and Biosecurity Threats

The risks posed by foreign espionage are not confined to electoral or military interference but extend into public health and biosecurity. In 2023, authorities discovered an unlicensed biolab in Reedley, California, operated by Prestige Biotech, a company with alleged connections to Chinese state enterprises. This facility was filled with hazardous biological agents, including pathogens like tuberculosis, COVID-19, HIV, and malaria, along with transgenic mice modified for pandemic-related research. Although the lab’s existence was unknown to local and federal agencies for months, a routine inspection brought its activities to light, revealing a disturbing lack of oversight and safety protocols. Despite the severe biosafety violations found at the site, lab personnel were evasive, and Prestige Biotech failed to provide critical documentation about the nature of their work, intensifying suspicions about the lab’s actual purpose.

This biolab’s discovery signals broader concerns about foreign influence and biosecurity within the U.S., particularly involving entities tied to the People’s Republic of China. Investigations revealed that Prestige Biotech inherited operations from Universal Meditech, a company with Chinese backing, and had been conducting research in the U.S. without complying with local licensing and health regulations. During the initial inspections, officials discovered unsanitary conditions, including improper containment of biohazardous materials, thousands of vials of unknown fluids, and genetically engineered mice designed to mimic the human immune system for COVID-19 research. This lapse in regulatory oversight underscores how biosecurity protocols can be exploited by foreign actors, enabling high-risk research to proceed unchecked in environments not equipped for containment or emergency response.

Similar cases have emerged worldwide, where unlicensed or clandestine biolabs with Chinese affiliations have raised alarm. In 2023, Germany, already cautious of foreign espionage, documented cases of unauthorized biological research tied to Chinese institutions, resulting in increased biosecurity protocols in research facilities. Germany’s response is part of a larger European Union effort to tighten controls on foreign involvement in critical research sectors. Concerns that such labs may serve covert agendas are especially pronounced given the lack of transparency often associated with Chinese-linked operations abroad. Reports of unsanctioned Chinese biolabs or Chinese-controlled biotech firms operating within sensitive fields further validate suspicions that seemingly benign biological research can double as an avenue for intelligence gathering or even bioterrorism-related activities.

The risks associated with unauthorized biolabs and inadequate regulatory checks have also prompted U.S. lawmakers to push for more stringent biosecurity protocols, especially for entities with foreign ownership or funding. Following the Reedley biolab’s discovery, calls for a federal registry of bio-research facilities have gained momentum. Such a registry would enforce more robust vetting, ensuring that biolabs comply with both local and federal standards. This move is seen as necessary to protect public health infrastructure from being compromised by poorly regulated entities that may prioritize profit or intelligence objectives over safety and transparency.

In response to these biosecurity challenges, federal and local agencies are also reexamining the mechanisms for sharing information about foreign-affiliated research institutions. The Reedley case illustrates how bureaucratic silos and jurisdictional limitations can delay crucial responses to high-risk facilities. Calls for a centralized system to monitor, inspect, and regulate foreign-linked biolabs are growing, with advocates arguing that greater transparency would enable faster action against violations and safeguard against potential threats.

These revelations reveal a critical intersection between public health, biosecurity, and foreign influence. When unsanctioned biolabs operate without accountability, they pose an undeniable threat not only to their immediate surroundings but to broader national security as well. With bio-research’s dual-use potential—capable of advancing public health or aiding malicious agendas—the presence of unregulated foreign-affiliated biolabs within U.S. borders has become a pressing issue. The need for enhanced legislation, dedicated oversight, and more extensive security measures is evident to protect against the dangers that these facilities represent in an era where public health is increasingly linked to national security.

Covert Biological Research and Proximity to Sensitive U.S. Sites

In addition to its infiltration of academic and corporate institutions, China has reportedly expanded its espionage activities to include covert biolabs and research facilities within the United States. This strategy involves establishing unauthorized or concealed research sites, often near critical U.S. infrastructure, to exploit weaknesses in oversight and monitor American scientific advancements. These biolabs have sparked significant concern among U.S. intelligence agencies, as they potentially serve dual-use purposes for scientific advancement and biological espionage. The implications of China’s presence in the biotech sector, especially within proximity to U.S. military and nuclear sites, are profound, reflecting a strategy that blends scientific collaboration with intelligence gathering and potential sabotage capabilities.

Proximity to Sensitive Military and Nuclear Sites

In some cases, China’s suspected biolab and other facilities are strategically located near U.S. nuclear facilities and military bases, raising red flags among intelligence agencies. By placing personnel and research assets in close proximity to these high-value sites, China gains the ability to conduct real-time surveillance on military activities. This tactic aligns with broader Chinese intelligence goals to monitor and, if possible, disrupt American defense capabilities.

For example, a recent investigation revealed that a Chinese-affiliated facility was operating just miles from a major U.S. nuclear site, with some personnel suspected of performing unauthorized environmental sampling. Such activities, while subtle, could provide valuable information on the security protocols and operational patterns of U.S. defense installations. This approach allows China to conduct low-risk, high-reward espionage, using scientific cover to bypass traditional security measures and extract valuable intelligence.

These close proximities serve a dual purpose: they allow Chinese operatives to monitor for potential vulnerabilities, and they provide a staging ground for further espionage. If information gathered from such sites is relayed back to Chinese military or intelligence agencies, it could give China insights into U.S. military readiness, technological innovations, and even nuclear security measures.

U.S. Counterintelligence and the Challenge of Biolab Oversight

The discovery of Chinese-affiliated biolabs in the U.S. has led to increased scrutiny and calls for enhanced biosecurity oversight. However, enforcing strict regulatory measures presents unique challenges, as many biolabs operate under the guise of legitimate commercial or academic enterprises. Unlike traditional espionage sites, biolabs are more difficult to monitor due to the scientific nature of their operations and the complex network of partnerships they often form with U.S.-based research entities.

The FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have increased their monitoring of biolab facilities, particularly those near sensitive sites. In some cases, biolabs linked to Chinese enterprises have been required to undergo audits to verify compliance with biosecurity standards, although these audits have uncovered a range of inconsistencies. This enforcement is complicated by the fact that some Chinese biolabs partner with legitimate U.S. universities and research centers, which may be unaware of their partners' ulterior motives. Efforts to tighten control over biolab operations must therefore balance the need for security with respect for scientific collaboration, making this an intricate and ongoing issue.

In addition, U.S. agencies are working to strengthen the legal framework surrounding foreign-owned biolabs and their ability to conduct genetic or infectious disease research. There is an emerging consensus among security officials that biolabs operated by foreign nationals or with opaque funding sources should be subject to enhanced security screenings and reporting requirements. However, these measures face resistance from parts of the scientific community that fear that over-regulation may stifle innovation and deter legitimate international partnerships.

Implications of Biolab Espionage on National Security

The potential threat posed by foreign-operated biolabs in the U.S. has wide-ranging implications for national security. The unauthorized collection of genetic data and the possible development of biotechnologies for hostile purposes represent risks that extend beyond conventional espionage. By gaining insights into American biomedical research and biosecurity protocols, China could accelerate its own biotechnology capabilities, with both economic and military consequences.

If left unchecked, the proliferation of covert biolab operations could give China significant advantages in the field of genetic research and precision medicine, enabling the development of biological agents that could be used in asymmetrical warfare. Moreover, the risk of accidental exposure to pathogens within these labs could lead to public health crises, as seen in past incidents involving lab mishandlings. As China continues to expand its reach into sensitive areas of U.S. biotechnology and biosecurity, the need for coordinated counterintelligence and biosecurity efforts has never been greater.

Furthermore, the insights gained from monitoring U.S. military installations through biolab espionage can enhance China’s military preparedness. The knowledge acquired could inform China’s own defense strategies, potentially allowing it to anticipate and counter U.S. military actions. The proximity of Chinese-affiliated facilities to critical infrastructure represents a novel and growing facet of Chinese intelligence operations that U.S. policymakers must address urgently to safeguard national interests.