Somalia Offers U.S. Port Access in Gamble for Legitimacy Amid Rising Terror Threats
Executive Summary
Somalia’s federal government has offered the United States “exclusive operational control” of key ports in the Gulf of Aden—despite not controlling them—in a desperate bid to prevent Washington from recognizing the breakaway region of Somaliland. The offer includes Berbera and Bosaso ports, both of which lie in territories hostile or autonomous from Mogadishu. The move comes amid heightened geopolitical jockeying in the Horn of Africa, growing U.S. interest in counterterrorism footholds, and fears that the Trump administration could pivot from nation-building to tactical counterterrorism partnerships. Somaliland and Puntland have dismissed the offer, exposing further fractures in Somalia’s federal model, while U.S. and Israeli interest in the region increases in light of their Gaza resettlement plan and Islamic State threats emerging from Puntland’s Golis mountains.
Analysis
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s letter to President Trump, dated March 16, offered American control over four sites, including the highly strategic Berbera and Bosaso ports and airbases. The move appears aimed at locking in U.S. support for Somalia’s sovereignty and forestalling any American recognition of Somaliland—a breakaway territory that has operated independently for over three decades and has growing U.S. and Israeli interest.
However, the Somali federal government’s actual control over the offered assets is questionable. Berbera is under Somaliland’s authority and operated by UAE-based DP World, a nation that backs Somaliland’s independence efforts. Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Adan called the federal government’s offer “desperate” and asserted that Washington knows “who they need to deal with” regarding Berbera. Similarly, Puntland—home to the Bosaso port—severed ties with Mogadishu in 2023 and has taken a more autonomous path in counterterror operations, especially against ISIS-Somalia.
The port maneuvering coincides with intensifying U.S. airstrikes in Puntland’s Golis mountains, which are now believed to be a major hub for ISIS-Somalia. Under Trump’s renewed emphasis on counterterrorism, U.S. Africa Command has targeted the group’s leadership and infrastructure, with Somali authorities hoping this signals continued American engagement. Still, many analysts believe the Trump administration sees little strategic value in propping up Somalia’s weak federal government and prefers direct relationships with more stable and strategic local actors—like Somaliland or Puntland—especially if it enables military access without long-term state-building obligations.
That strategy is reflected in broader Trump-era outreach. U.S. and Israeli officials have reportedly approached Somalia, Somaliland, and Sudan as possible relocation sites for displaced Palestinians from Gaza—part of Trump’s controversial postwar plan. Though Somalia denies any such engagement, the inclusion of the region in secret diplomacy underlines its perceived utility as a geopolitical pawn. Somaliland, seeking U.S. recognition, may be more open to these discussions than Somalia, which remains vocally pro-Palestinian.
Islamic State-Somalia’s rising threat profile further complicates this landscape. U.S. and Puntland authorities report that the group is increasingly internationalized, composed primarily of foreign fighters from North Africa and the Middle East. With an estimated strength of 600–1,000 fighters and a key financial base in Puntland, IS-Somalia is growing in capacity and strategic relevance. The group’s December 2024 attack, executed by operatives from seven different countries, shows its global ambitions and tactical sophistication. Western and regional analysts fear the group could soon support or inspire attacks outside Africa.
Somalia’s central government, constrained by limited control beyond Mogadishu, appears to be leveraging symbolic gestures—like the offer of strategic ports—to retain U.S. backing and reassert itself as a legitimate partner. However, without control over key territories or buy-in from semi-autonomous regions, its geopolitical gambits may further expose internal fractures rather than consolidate national strength.
